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I document that emerging markets have cast off their “original sin”--their external liabilities are no
longer dominated by foreign-currency debt and have instead shifted sharply towards direct investment
and portfolio equity. Their external assets are increasingly concentrated in foreign exchange reserves
held in advanced economy government bonds. Given the enormous and rising public debt burdens
of reserve currency economies, this means that the long-term risk on emerging markets’ external balance
sheets is shifting to the asset side. However, emerging markets continue to look for more insurance
against balance of payments crises, even as self-insurance through reserve accumulation itself becomes
riskier. I discuss a possible mechanism for global liquidity insurance that would meet emerging markets’
demand for insurance with fewer domestic policy distortions while facilitating a quicker adjustment
of global imbalances. I also argue that emerging markets have become less dependent on foreign finance
and more resilient to capital flow volatility. The main risk that increasing financial openness poses
for these economies is that capital flows exacerbate vulnerabilities arising from weak domestic policies
and institutions.
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The global financial crisis has sparked a reconsideration of the role of unfettered capital 
flows in the new international economic order. Far from fulfilling their promises of 
boosting growth and helping to diversify risk, capital flows are now seen by some as a 
destructive force, causing crises that take down countries and scorch innocent bystanders 
in their wake. Yet, despite all the opprobrium directed at them, capital flows are resurgent 
once again. Many emerging markets in fact face the problem of plenty as their strong 
growth prospects fuel surges of inflows and create pressures on domestic inflation, asset 
prices and exchange rates. 
 
In this paper, I first evaluate recent trends in global financial integration and examine 
whether the financial crisis has halted or reversed this process. Next, I examine the 
evolution of the structures of external balance sheets of the major advanced and emerging 
market economies and evaluate the implications for capital flows and vulnerability to 
external shocks. Third, I review the main elements of a global insurance mechanism that 
may help emerging markets obviate the domestic and collective costs of self-insurance 
through reserve accumulation. Fourth, I review the changing complexion of risks that 
capital account openness poses for emerging markets.
2  
 
The main points of the paper are as follows: 
 
1. The financial crisis represented only a brief pause in the process of global financial 
integration. External balance sheets are expanding rapidly for virtually all major economies. 
Rising gross external asset and liability positions imply greater financial integration but 
also higher capital flow volatility due to currency fluctuations, portfolio rebalancing, and 
                                                 
2 I use the IMF classification of advanced economies and emerging markets. Countries with per 
capita income of over $15,000 in 2010 (at market exchange rates) are counted as advanced 
economies. The list changes only marginally when one uses purchasing power parity-adjusted 
exchange rates and an income threshold of about $18,000 in 2010 (Hungary and Poland would then 
be classified as advanced). The 58 economies—29 advanced and 29 emerging—included in the 
analysis sample account for about 90 percent of global GDP and are listed in the appendix. 
Switching economies like Hong Kong, Israel, Korea and Singapore to the emerging markets 
category only strengthens many of the empirical observations in this paper.    2
greater exposure to other external shocks. This may increase emerging markets’ demand 
for insurance against capital flow volatility and balance of payments crises.  
 
2. In the past, foreign currency-denominated external debt dominated the external 
liabilities of emerging markets. That has now shifted, with FDI and portfolio equity 
accounting for the majority of liabilities. Even external debt issued by these countries is 
increasingly denominated in their own currencies. This structure of liabilities is consistent 
with the objective of sharing risk across countries, with foreign investors bearing capital as 
well as currency risk on such investment. Emerging markets have thus accumulated 
enough good karma to cast off their “original sin.”
3 By contrast, portfolio debt and bank 
loans together constitute the major share of the external liabilities of advanced economies.   
 
3. The asset positions of emerging market external balance sheets (not just for China) are 
becoming increasingly dominated by foreign exchange reserves, mostly held in 
government bonds issued by the four major reserve currency areas (U.S., Euro Area, Japan, 
U.K.). The recent global financial crisis has if anything accentuated the incentives for 
accumulating reserves for self-insurance purposes, thereby ensuring that the foreign 
demand for these advanced economy government bonds remains strong.  
 
4. The level of public debt in the major reserve currency economies is high and rising, 
imposing an enormous burden on these economies and constraining their macroeconomic 
policy responses to shocks. A substantial fraction of the global increase in central 
government debt over the next five years is likely to be accounted for by advanced 
economies, especially the U.S. and Japan. As the safety of the sovereign bonds of 
advanced economies comes into question, the risk on emerging market balance sheets has 
now shifted mostly to the asset side. These countries may be forced to rethink the notion 
that advanced economy sovereign assets are “safe” assets, although they are certainly 
highly liquid.  
                                                 
3 The term original sin was introduced by Eichengreen and Hausmann at the 1999 Jackson Hole 
Symposium. The term refers to the fact that, during the 1980s and 1990s, emerging markets’ 
capital inflows were mostly in the form of short-term foreign currency-denominated external debt 
rather than more favorable forms of capital such as FDI or portfolio equity.     3
5. Self-insurance through accumulation of ostensibly safe assets is becoming increasingly 
costly for emerging markets. Reserve accumulation involves intervention in foreign 
exchange markets and sterilization to mitigate the inflationary consequences thereof. The 
costs of conducting sterilized interventions are likely to rise in tandem with the rising 
differentials between the interest rates of emerging and advanced economies. Moreover, 
the high debt levels of advanced economies will crowd out private investment in those 
economies and could lower their productivity growth relative to emerging markets. This 
suggests that emerging market currencies are eventually going to appreciate against those 
of the advanced economies, which in turn implies a significant wealth transfer (in nominal 
domestic currency terms) in the future from the former group of countries to the latter.  
 
6. Emerging market economies need a simple insurance mechanism that is characterized 
by ex-ante rather than ex-post conditionality in terms of a country’s macroeconomic 
policies, does not involve the stigma associated with the IMF, and involves an 
unconditional payout at the time of a balance of payments crisis. To minimize moral 
hazard, the mechanism should offer insurance against liquidity risk rather than solvency 
risk. I discuss a mechanism that would satisfy these criteria.  
 
7. For emerging markets, the major risks from capital inflows are now less about balance 
of payments crises arising from dependence on foreign capital than about capital inflows 
accentuating domestic policy conundrums. For instance, foreign capital inflows add fuel to 
domestic credit expansions, a factor that made some emerging markets vulnerable to the 
aftershocks of the recent crisis. New risks from capital account openness are related to 
existing sources of domestic instability--rising inequality in wealth and in opportunities for 
diversification and sharing risk. Capital inflows and the resulting pressure for currency 
appreciations also have distributional implications as they exacerbate inflation, which 
disproportionately hurts the poor, and adversely affect the growth of industrial 
employment. For most emerging markets the right solution to these problems is likely to 
involve establishing a richer set of financial markets to better absorb capital inflows and 
manage volatility, broadening access to the formal financial system (financial inclusion), 
and improving the quality of domestic institutions and governance.     4
2. Financial Globalization  
 
In the lead up to and right after the global financial crisis of 2008-09, much of the 
discussion about global capital flows was centered on global macroeconomic imbalances 
and the uphill flows of capital from emerging markets to advanced economies. To this day, 
there is a raging debate about whether or not these current account imbalances were an 
“equilibrium” phenomenon and how much they contributed to precipitating the financial 
crisis. Figure 1 shows that capital continues to flow uphill, although China and the U.S. 
now seem to be the key drivers of this phenomenon.
4 While the ebbs and flows of current 
account balances have garnered much of the attention, in the background global financial 
integration has continued unabated.  
 
In a process that started in the mid-1980s and picked up pace over the past decade, 
advanced economies and emerging markets have substantially increased their integration 
into global financial markets. This is evident from the rising gross positions of 
international assets and liabilities. Figure 2 shows that there has been a generalized 
increase in de facto financial openness, as measured by the ratio of the sum of gross stocks 
of external assets and liabilities to GDP.
5 Among advanced economies, the median level of 
this ratio has more than doubled over the past decade. The increase is significant but 
smaller for emerging markets. By this criterion, advanced economies are much more 
integrated into global financial markets than the emerging market economies.  
 
Table 1, which includes data for 2010, confirms that financial globalization increased 
sharply during the period 2000-07 and is on the rebound after the financial crisis. China 
and India were relatively closed in de facto terms in 2000 but have become much more 
                                                 
4 For a more detailed documentation of uphill capital flows and their implications, see Prasad, 
Rajan and Subramanian (2007). Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) note that conventional theoretical 
models predict that countries with higher productivity growth should attract more foreign capital, 
but data on the allocation of foreign capital across developing countries show the opposite.  
5 A standard dataset used in this literature is the External Wealth of Nations database constructed 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Most of the major economies now report their international 
investment positions (IIP), although only for the last decade or so in many cases. I use official IIP 
data as the baseline source in this paper—this has an added advantage of helping me include 2010 
data for many countries (the LMF dataset has been updated through 2009). I use LMF data for 
historical comparisons and for countries that do not provide IIP data.    5
open since then. Other than Brazil and Russia, which experienced small dips, virtually 
every major economy—advanced or emerging—has a higher level of assets and liabilities 
relative to GDP in 2010 compared to 2007, indicating that the financial crisis did not 
reverse or stop rising global financial integration.  
 
Rising gross external positions have important implications for growth, international risk 
sharing and financial stability. As gross stocks of external assets and liabilities grow in 
size, currency volatility will have a larger impact on fluctuations in external wealth and on 
current account balances.
6 In particular, net factor income flows have already started 
playing an increasingly important role in driving current account fluctuations (rather than 
the trade balance, which used to dominate the current account for most countries). This has 
implications for evaluating appropriate/sustainable levels of current accounts.  
 
Large gross positions imply far greater risks than those implied by net positions that may 
be small relative to the size of gross flows or stocks. Larger gross positions could mean 
greater volatility of capital flows due to external shocks as even modest portfolio 
rebalancing effects of international investors could lead to large fluctuations in net flows. 
Also, the level of net inflows may not be a good indicator of vulnerability if net flows are 
small relative to gross inflows and outflows. When an economy comes under pressure, 
gross inflows could stop and gross outflows could surge simultaneously, leading to a 
double blow in terms of net flows.
7 Hence, countries may view rising gross positions as an 
incentive to accumulate more reserves to guard against externally-induced crises. 
 
By the same token, large gross positions can provide better risk sharing, assuming that the 
currency, country and instrument composition of assets and liabilities is conducive to that. 
Given that country-specific risks cannot be insured within a country, cross-border flows or 
wealth redistributions are the relevant channel for international risk sharing. With large 
                                                 
6 Obstfeld (2010) alluded to some of these issues in his remarks at last year’s conference. Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2008) analyze the factors that drive changes in countries’ gross external positions.  
7 Forbes and Warnock (2011) analyze gross flows around crises and try to disentangle sudden stops 
or reversals of gross inflows (related to nonresident investors) from surges of gross outflows (by 
residents). They find that dynamics of gross inflows and outflows are driven by similar factors and 
that gross flows are more relevant than net flows for explaining currency crashes.   6
gross positions, even small currency fluctuations can generate large implied wealth 




Typically, if a country faces a crisis such as a financial meltdown or pressures on its 
sovereign debt, its currency would depreciate, thereby automatically transferring some of 
the adjustment costs onto foreign holders of its liabilities. But this is true only if a 
country’s liabilities are denominated in the domestic currency. Liabilities denominated in 
foreign currencies could exacerbate the impact of adverse shocks that lead to currency 
depreciation as the value of such liabilities would then rise in domestic currency terms. 
Domestic price dynamics combined with currency depreciation will then determine how 
the impact of adverse shocks is distributed among domestic agents and the foreign holders 
of a country’s liabilities. The magnitudes of these effects also depend on the shares of 
liabilities and assets that are fixed-income instruments versus those that have an equity 
component; the latter involve more sharing of risk between domestic and foreign investors.  
 
While rising gross positions clearly have a major impact, a closer examination of the 
structure of external assets and liabilities is warranted as that structure has implications for 
the potential benefits of financial integration in terms of both growth and risk sharing.  
 
3. Risk and the Structure of Country Balance Sheets  
 
I now turn to an examination of the international investment positions (IIP) of a set of 
major advanced and emerging market economies. The IIP is essentially a country’s balance 
sheet vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It provides an indication of a country’s gross external 
assets and liabilities as well as the composition of each side of the balance sheet.  
 
                                                 
8 Currency fluctuations generate implicit wealth transfers due to currency valuation effects if 
external assets and liabilities are denominated in different currencies. Gourinchas, Rey and 
Truempler (2011) estimate that there was a substantial net “wealth transfer” of about $2.2 trillion 
from the U.S. to the rest of the world over the period 2007Q4 to 2009Q1. This was at the height of 
the financial crisis and could in part reflect valuation effects from the strengthening of the dollar 
during that period as money flooded into the U.S. in search of a safe haven.   7
Table 2 shows the latest IIP position for a key set of economies. Among the advanced 
economies, the U.K. and the U.S. have significant net liabilities while Germany and Japan 
have net asset positions. For all of these advanced economies, the category “other 
investment”—which mainly covers bank loans—is an important share of liabilities. When 
one adds in portfolio debt—which is mainly corporate as well as government debt—it is 
clear that debt accounts for the majority of external liabilities.  
 
Among the emerging markets shown in this table, China has a large net asset position, 
Brazil has a significant net liability position and India has a small net liability position. 
Large net liability positions are no longer the norm for emerging markets. More 
importantly, there has been a dramatic shift in the external liability structure of emerging 
markets during the past decade. While in the past these economies’ external liabilities were 
dominated by debt, now FDI and portfolio equity have become predominant. In 2010, 
these two components account for two-thirds of total external liabilities for Brazil and 
China, 51 percent for India and 56 percent for Russia (77 percent for South Africa). What 
is even more interesting is that, on the asset side, foreign exchange reserves account for a 
large share of total external assets—47 percent for Brazil, 69 percent for China, 68 percent 
for India and 37 percent for Russia (13 percent for South Africa). 
 
Table 3 provides a more comprehensive picture of the structure of balance sheets for the 
two country groups and for some key economies at the beginning and end of the decade, as 
well as in the pre-crisis year--2007. The first two panels show the shares of FDI and 
portfolio equity liabilities, respectively, in total external liabilities. For emerging markets, 
the median share of FDI liabilities in total external liabilities increased by 9 percentage 
points over the decade. As measured by the group ratio (which essentially weights 
countries by the relative size of the liability stocks), the increase in the share of FDI is 
about 13 percentage points. Together the share of FDI and portfolio equity liabilities in 
total external liabilities has climbed to 61 percent. By contrast, for advanced economies, 
this ratio is much lower at 29 percent.  
   8
On the asset side, the major shift on emerging market balances sheets lies in the increase in 
foreign exchange reserves as a share of total assets. The average share of foreign exchange 
reserves in total assets has risen from about 32 percent in 2000 to 53 percent in 2010. The 
median of country-specific ratios is lower, although there was still a 9 percentage point 
increase from 2000 to 2007 in the share of reserves in total external assets. 
 
The changing structure of emerging market balance sheets can be seen more clearly in 
Table 4. Over the period 2000-2007, changes in FDI liabilities account for nearly half of 
the increase in overall liabilities. FDI and portfolio liabilities together account for about 70 
percent of the increase in liabilities. On the asset side, reserve accumulation accounts for 
about half of the overall increase in external assets. As the last row of the table indicates, 
these results are not just driven by China. Indeed, a majority of the emerging markets 
experienced an increase in the share of foreign exchange reserves in total external assets 
over this period. Figure 3 shows that these changes reflect the continuation of a process 
that started in the mid-1980s and was only temporarily halted by the crisis.  
 
These numbers reveal a striking shift in the composition of external portfolios of emerging 
markets. On the liabilities side, the shift towards FDI and portfolio equity is consistent 
with greater international risk sharing.
9 As noted earlier, when the value of these 
investments falls either in domestic terms or due to a currency depreciation (or both), 
foreign investors bear part of the risk. One concern is that portfolio equity flows can be 
volatile and highly procyclical. In the face of a negative shock, portfolio investors might 
rapidly withdraw capital from a country thereby putting downward pressure on the 
currency. Nevertheless, the threat posed by outflows of portfolio equity capital is far less 
devastating than the rollover risk on short-term foreign currency debt that used to plague 
emerging markets.  
 
The change in the structure of liabilities and the proliferation of flexible exchange rate 
regimes has substantially reduced emerging markets’ vulnerability to balance of payments 
                                                 
9 Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009) show that for emerging markets FDI and portfolio equity 
liabilities improve international risk sharing outcomes. Debt liabilities have the opposite effect.    9
and currency crises. This is not a uniformly true proposition, with emerging markets in 
Europe having become much more reliant on foreign bank loans before the crisis. But the 
large majority of emerging markets have indeed experienced these positive shifts. 
 
Currency depreciations are far less of a risk for emerging markets now than they were in 
the debt-dominated era. First, the effects of such currency devaluations are likely to be 
small since emerging markets no longer have large stocks of foreign currency-denominated 
external debt, either sovereign or corporate. Thus, the devastating balance sheet effects that 
brought some Asian economies to their knees during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 
are less of a concern today. Indeed, with many emerging markets now able to issue 
international debt denominated in their own currencies, even debt is no longer as fearsome 
as it once was.
10  
 
Second, currency depreciation generates a nominal wealth transfer in favor of the home 
country (in domestic currency terms) through valuation effects if a country’s liabilities are 
denominated in domestic currency and assets are denominated in foreign currencies. This 
privilege was once limited to the large reserve currency economies but is becoming more 
widespread.  
 
Competitive non-appreciations through intervention in foreign exchange markets now take 
on a more complex function as they involve not just the maintenance of price 
competitiveness in external trade but also serve to limit a country’s wealth transfers to the 
rest of the world.
11 Thus, among emerging markets, the fear of currency appreciation now 
has two underlying causes rather than just the implications for trade.  
 
Even with this more benign structure of liabilities, emerging markets have not fully torn 
themselves away from the desire for insurance that would provide an infusion of liquidity 
                                                 
10 Based on BIS data, Burger, Warnock and Warnock (2010) report that in 2008 local currency 
denominated debt accounted for 85 percent of the outstanding stock of international bonds issued 
by emerging markets. The shares for different regions are as follows: Emerging Europe--70 
percent; Latin America--72 percent; Asia--95 percent. The International Finance Corporation 
reports that in 2008 local currency debt accounted for roughly 70 percent of emerging market debt.  
11 The ironic phrase about non-appreciation is attributed to Edwin Truman.    10
at times of global crises. Figure 4 shows the rapid rate of reserve accumulation by 
emerging markets, which peaked in 2007, declined but remained positive in 2008-09, and 
then began to pick up again in 2010. Total foreign exchange reserves of emerging markets 
now amount to about $6.4 trillion, with China accounting for half of this stock (Figure 5). 
The fact that several countries, including China and India, don’t report the currency 
composition of their reserves has led to a rising share of reserves of unknown currency 
composition. For reserves whose currency composition is known, the U.S. dollar still 
remains dominant, accounting for about 60 percent of reserves. The euro’s share has 
leveled off at around 30 percent. The Japanese yen and the pound sterling account for most 
of the remaining reserves whose currency composition is known.  
 
The remarkable paradox in international finance is that the emerging markets’ increasing 
desire for self-insurance has, if anything, increased global risks and transferred the major 
risks on those countries’ balance sheets from the liability side to the asset side. The notion 
that the flow of official capital from emerging markets represents a search for “safe” assets 
seems rather tenuous if one examines the public debt trajectories of the advanced 
economies. I turn next to this issue.  
 
4. Global Debt and Reserve Dynamics 
 
The accumulation of reserves has been associated with a search by emerging markets for 
“safe assets” – typically government bonds of advanced economies.
12 To examine the 
evolution of such assets around the world, I now examine trajectories of net government 
debt around the world.
13  
                                                 
12 Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008a, 2008b) argue that emerging markets’ search for safe 
assets precipitated global macroeconomic imbalances. Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2010) 
make a related point that the greater financial depth of advanced economies attracts large inflows.  
13 I focus on central government securities as those are most relevant for reserve accumulation. Net 
debt is preferable for the purposes of my analysis as the remaining portion of gross debt is typically 
held domestically. The difference between gross and net public debt relates to intra-governmental 
holdings of debt. For instance, in the U.S., social security trust fund surpluses are held in 
government securities. These count towards gross but not net public debt. For the subject of this 
paper—the reliance of national governments on foreign financing of their debt—net debt is a more 
suitable concept. In any event, using gross rather than net debt strengthens the patterns in the data 
that I discuss below and accentuates concerns about public debt levels of advanced economies. For   11
The global financial crisis triggered a sharp increase in public debt levels, both in absolute 
terms and relative to GDP. Data from the IMF’s June 2011 Fiscal Monitor show that the 
level of aggregate net government debt in the world rose from $22 trillion in 2007 to an 
expected $34 trillion in 2011. IMF forecasts indicate the level will reach $48 trillion in 
2016. The ratio of world net debt to world GDP rose from 42 percent in 2007 to 57 percent 
in 2011, and is expected to hit 58 percent in 2016. 
 
Since the onset of the crisis, the bulk of the increase in global public debt is accounted for 
by advanced economies. Relative to their GDP, debt levels in these economies are 
expected to continue rising in the next few years. By contrast, debt ratios will shrink for 
emerging markets. Indeed, advanced economies account for the bulk of the increase in 
global public debt since 2007, both in absolute terms and relative to GDP. 
 
  Aggregate debt of advanced economies will increase from $18 trillion in 2007 to 
$30 trillion in 2011, and is expected to rise to $41 trillion in 2016 (Figure 6). The 
corresponding numbers for emerging markets are $4 trillion, $5 trillion and $7 
trillion, respectively.
14 
  The ratio of aggregate debt to aggregate GDP for advanced economies will rise 
from 46 percent in 2007 to 70 percent in 2011 and further to 80 percent in 2016. 
The corresponding ratios for emerging markets are 28 percent, 26 percent and 21 
percent, respectively. 
 
There is a stark contrast between the two groups of countries in their relative contributions 
to growth in world debt versus growth in world GDP. Emerging markets contribute far 
more to growth in global GDP than to the growth in global public debt. Some illustrative 
statistics follow: 
                                                                                                                                                    
more detailed data, including estimates of the burden of central government debt (debt per capita or 
per working-age person), see Prasad and Ding (2011) and www.ft.com/debtburden.   
14 The reported debt levels of emerging markets should be interpreted with caution. In China, for 
instance, financial liabilities of provincial governments and contingent liabilities such as 
nonperforming assets held by the state-owned banking system imply a much higher value of 
government debt obligations than indicated by official statistics. Of course, as the recent crisis has 
shown, advanced economy governments arguably have similar implicit contingent liabilities if their 
big banks were to run aground or their public pension systems were to run out of money.    12
  In 2007, emerging markets accounted for 25 percent of world GDP and 17 percent 
of world debt (Figures 7-8). By 2016, they are expected to produce 38 percent of 
world output and account for just 14 percent of world debt.  
  In 2011 (based on IMF estimates at market exchange rates), the four major reserve 
currency areas together account for 58 percent of global GDP and 81 percent of 
global debt.  
  Emerging markets account for 9 percent of the increase in global debt levels from 
2007 to 2011 and are expected to account for 13 percent of the increase from 2011 
to 2016 (Figure 9). By contrast, their contributions to increases in global GDP over 
these two periods are 66 percent and 56 percent, respectively.  
  The two biggest advanced economies are making a far greater contribution to the 
rise in global debt than to the rise in global GDP. The U.S. contributes 37 percent 
of the increase in global debt from 2007 to 2011 and 40 percent from 2011 to 2016. 
Its contributions to the increases in global GDP over those two periods are 8 
percent and 18 percent, respectively. Japan accounts for 20 percent of the increase 
in debt from 2007 to 2011 and 34 percent from 2011 to 2016 while its contributions 
to the increase in global GDP are 4 percent and 8 percent, respectively.  
 
High and rising debt levels among advanced economies pose serious risks to global 
macroeconomic stability. Of course, the implications of rising debt levels and their 
sustainability depend to a large extent on whether these debts are financed from domestic 
savings or by foreign investors. In the case of the U.S., foreign investors—both official and 
private-—hold about half of the outstanding stock of net central government debt (Figure 
10). This ratio is lower for the U.K.—about one-third of its net debt is held by foreign 
investors—and even lower—less than 10 percent—for Japan, which has a very high 
domestic savings rate. I have not been able to find comprehensive figures for the euro area. 
IMF data suggest that the ratio is between 40-50 percent for Germany, Italy and Spain and 
much higher for some of the smaller economies such as Greece and Ireland, although these 
figures include within-euro area holdings and do not provide a clear picture of how much 
euro area sovereign debt is held by investors from outside the euro area.  
   13
Figure 11 provides further detail on the extent to which foreign investors finance U.S. debt 
accumulation. The figure shows the increase in the net stock of outstanding debt and the 
increase in the share of net debt held by foreign investors. Foreign investors have played 
an important role in the financing of net U.S. debt. During 2008-10, when net debt 
accumulation soared to $1.3 trillion per year, foreign investors accumulated $695 billion 
per year, accounting for just over half of total U.S. net debt issuance.  
 
These figures paint a sobering picture of worsening public debt dynamics and a sharply 
rising public debt burden in advanced economies, along with a high level of dependence on 
foreign investors in search of a safe haven, especially in the case of the U.S. The major 
reserve currency economies—especially the U.S. and Japan—face daunting trajectories of 
public debt and weak growth prospects. These economies have had the benefit of being 
able to issue sovereign debt in their own currencies, allowing them to essentially transfer 
currency risk to the foreign purchasers of their sovereign debt.  
 
Advanced economies have not been subject to original sin but their accumulated sins will 
eventually catch up with them. Indeed, with low levels of population growth, rapidly aging 
populations and rising costs of health care and other entitlement programs, advanced 
economies could be in far worse shape beyond the medium-term horizon discussed in this 
section if they do not bring their public finances under control.
15  
 
As demonstrated by recent events in the euro zone, bond investors—both domestic and 
foreign—can quickly turn against a vulnerable country with high debt levels, leaving the 
country little breathing room on fiscal tightening and eventually precipitating a crisis. The 
U.S. is large, special and central to global finance but the tolerance of bond investors may 
have its limits.  
 
In advanced economies, rising public debt levels imply significant crowding-out effects 
that will affect productivity growth and could generate a persistent productivity growth gap 
                                                 
15 Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2010) present sobering projections of advanced economies’ 
long-term debt levels under current policies in those countries.    14
relative to emerging markets. Balance sheets of households and the financial sector in 
advanced economies were severely damaged by the financial crisis and are only now 
beginning to recover, putting a further crimp on these economies’ growth prospects. All of 
this implies that emerging markets’ currencies will in the long run tend to appreciate 
relative to those of the major advanced economies, implying a large wealth transfer from 
poorer to richer economies.  
 
If one looks at the overall level of foreign exchange reserves and the fact that nearly all of 
these reserves are held in U.S. dollars, euros and yen, the implications in terms of a capital 
loss in domestic currency terms for emerging markets are quite significant. For instance, 
for China, a 10 percent decline in nominal exchange rates against each of the major reserve 
currencies would imply a capital loss of about 300 billion dollars just from currency 
valuation effects.
16 These issues raise serious questions about what it means for emerging 
markets to hold government bonds of advanced economies as safe assets.  
 
With these unfavorable debt dynamics, why is the U.S. still in the position of being 
liquidity provider of last resort? The same question can be asked of the other major reserve 
currency economies. The answer must lie in the quality of public institutions as well as 
financial market depth, which means that at least investments in those countries’ bonds are 
liquid and easily tradable. The rush into U.S. treasury bonds in the presence of global 
financial turmoil is then more a flight to liquidity and depth than a flight to safety.  
 
How can emerging market countries protect themselves against external crises precipitated 
by global shocks? How can they do this without incurring huge insurance costs? Are there 
any alternatives that emerging markets can count on in the absence of really safe and liquid 
assets? I now discuss a mechanism that attempts to tackle these issues.  
                                                 
16 A counter-argument is that the currency value is of little consequence as the dollar holdings 
represent claims on U.S. goods and services that are denominated in dollars. This argument 
assumes that the high U.S. debt levels will not have major inflationary consequences in the U.S. 
Another issue is that, in the process of sterilizing inflows, the People’s Bank of China has issued 
central bank bonds that are effectively liabilities denominated in renminbi and match a significant 
proportion of the dollar assets. Even if the capital loss on the dollar-denominated assets nets out 
within the government as the PBOC bonds are held by state-owned banks, the real cost is the 
massive financial repression needed to maintain the tightly-managed exchange rate regime.     15
5. Global Liquidity Insurance 
 
To being with, consider why countries accumulate reserves. Some countries like China 
have built up reserves in the process of keeping their currency undervalued, thereby 
increasing their export competitiveness but at the cost of less balanced growth. Another 
objective is to accumulate reserves as insurance against volatile capital flows and to 
smooth associated fluctuations in aggregate consumption. Reserves can also be used to 
fend off attacks on the domestic currency, although this is less of a concern for countries 
with flexible exchange rates. It is difficult to evaluate the extent of reserve accumulation 
that is attributable to precautionary motives as opposed to mercantilist policies. If an 
alternative to self-insurance were available, one would have a more straightforward answer 
to this question.  
 
How much insurance is enough? Conventional criteria suggest a level sufficient to cover 6 
months of imports or the stock of short-term external debt maturing over the next year (the 
Greenspan-Guidotti rule). By these criteria, most major emerging markets had accumulated 
more than sufficient reserves by the early 2000s. Other criteria, related to measures of 
financial stability and financial openness, do a better job of explaining the incentives 
behind the sharp run-up in reserves during the past decade. But even with this set of 
augmented criteria it is difficult to fully rationalize the continued increase in reserves after 
the mid-2000s, especially among Asian economies.
17  
 
In any event, all such notions of reserve adequacy took a beating during the crisis. India 
lost about $66 billion of its stock of $305 billion of foreign exchange reserves in a matter 
of 6 months. Russia’s reserves fell by a third over a 7-month period starting from July 
2008. Table 5 shows that, in a selected group of 13 emerging markets that experienced 
                                                 
17 A speech by Jose De Gregorio (2011), Chile’s central bank governor, explicitly references 
reserve accumulation for precautionary purposes. Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010) estimate 
a model of reserve stocks that includes M2, financial openness, ability to access foreign currency 
through debt markets, and exchange rate policy. These variables do better at explaining emerging 
markets’ reserve accumulation during the 2000s than traditional models that only include imports 
and external short-term debt. For other analyses of accumulation motives and criteria for reserve 
adequacy, see Aizenman and Lee (2007), Jeanne (2007) and Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito 
(2011).    16
significant reserve losses, the median reserve loss was 27 percent of peak reserves over a 
seven-month period. Some emerging markets did not lose much of their stock of reserves; 
China even continued to accumulate reserves through the crisis period. Nevertheless, with 
rising financial integration and ever larger positions of gross flows and stocks, in the 
aftermath of the crisis emerging markets face stronger incentives to obtain higher levels of 
insurance through the accumulation of massive stocks of reserves. Indeed, virtually all 
emerging markets have been rebuilding or continuing to increase their reserve stocks after 
2009. The last column of Table 5 shows that, by April 2011, most of the countries that 
experienced major reserve losses during the crisis had rebuilt their reserve positions and 
were approaching or had already exceeded their pre-crisis levels of reserves. 
 
Self-insurance tends to be costly for emerging markets that have to tie up resources in 
advanced economy government bonds rather than using them to meet their own physical 
capital investment needs. Another cost involves the higher yields paid on domestic 
government bonds used to sterilize the liquidity effects of foreign inflows relative to the 
low yields earned on reserves held in advanced economy bonds. Some economies limit 
their sterilization costs through financial repression. In China, bank deposit rates are 
capped, allowing state-owned banks to buy central bank bonds for relatively low yields 
while still making a profit. Financial repression, in addition to impeding the efficient 
operation of financial markets, has direct costs to households.
18 Such insurance may also 
prove expensive in the long run in terms of an eventual capital loss from the anticipated 
depreciation of advanced economy currencies relative to those of emerging markets or if 
advanced economy governments drive down the real value of their bonds through inflation.  
Moreover, there is a collective action problem associated with reserve accumulation by 
emerging markets as it provides cheap financing for the fiscal profligacy of advanced 
economies while increasing the risks of future crises. During the financial crisis, the 
concern prevailed that if a number of emerging markets simultaneously tried to liquidate 
their holdings of U.S. government securities, financial markets could be further 
                                                 
18 See Prasad (2009a) for a discussion of this issue in the context of China. Lardy (2010) estimates 
the cost to households of financial repression in China—as captured by the low or negative real 
interest rates paid on households’ bank deposits—at about 4 percent of GDP per annum.    17
destabilized. Thus, in many ways, massive reserve accumulation makes those reserves less 
valuable at a time of global crisis and in fact reduces the value of insurance as it heightens 
global risks. Regional insurance pools can alleviate some of these problems but are likely 
to prove inadequate if a number of countries in a region are subject to the same shock.  
 
How then can we obviate the motives for self-insurance by emerging markets, along with 




The previous discussion suggests a different approach to the provision of global insurance 
than existing mechanisms, one that involves an insurance pool for the world’s major 
economies—mainly but not necessarily just for the emerging markets. Each country would 
pay a modest entry fee between $1 and 10 billion, depending on its size as measured by 
GDP, to provide an initial capital base. It would then pay an annual premium for buying 
insurance that it could call upon in the event of a crisis.  
The premium would depend on the level of insurance desired and could on average be 
about 5 percent of the face value of the insurance policy ($5 billion in annual premiums for 
$100 billion of insurance). This premium level would be of roughly the same order of 
magnitude as the quasi-fiscal cost of reserve accumulation through sterilized intervention 
and the implied cost of a 2-3 percent annual depreciation of the reserve currencies’ values 
against emerging market currencies over the long term, based on productivity growth 
differentials.  
The level of the premium in a particular year would depend not only on the level of 
insurance desired but also the quality of a country’s policies. There would be higher 
premiums for a country that chose to run large budget deficits or that accumulated large 
amounts of debt, thereby increasing its vulnerability to crises. The principle is analogous to 
car insurance, where owners of more expensive cars and riskier drivers (based on verifiable 
characteristics like age and gender) face higher premiums. There would be discounts from 
the base level for countries that have demonstrated policy discipline.    18
Premiums would have to be based on simple and transparent rules. For instance, a current 
account deficit larger than 2 percent of a country’s GDP triggers a higher premium. Other 
criteria that affect premia could be based on variables such as fiscal deficits, public debt 
and external debt (all relative to GDP). To keep things simple, there would be no country-
specific adjustments--such as adjusting the budget deficit for business cycle conditions--
that would be contentious and also difficult to deal with in real time.  
The premiums would increase in a nonlinear fashion with the persistence and levels of 
policies that contributed to an economy’s vulnerability. A country running large budget 
deficits or continuing to accumulate large stocks of external debt in successive years would 
pay rising premiums in each of those years. In this way, the country’s contributions to 
rising global risks would be accounted for. Likewise there would be a nonlinear premium 
schedule for countries requiring larger levels of insurance relative to their economic size. 
As the premiums and the size of the insurance pool increased, the premiums could 
gradually be scaled down for all countries. 
This is a transparent rules-based mechanism to strengthen the power of moral suasion to 
get a country to at least partially internalize the effects of its own policies on global risks. 
There is no stigma or signaling effect associated with the premium levels as they are based 
on country variables that are all public knowledge.
19 
The premiums could be tweaked with a novel feature—charge higher premiums from 
countries with policies that might serve them well individually but could drive up global 
risks. A country may well decide that accumulating a large stock of reserves by preventing 
currency appreciation is in its own interest. There is not much the world could do about 
this other than retaliating by blocking trade from that country, which could start a trade war 
that hurts everyone.  
So why not just charge that country a higher premium based on the size of its stock of 
                                                 
19 Some commentators have suggested that these premiums could be linked to market-based 
measures of country risk as captured by debt or CDS spreads. However, policymakers will be 
reluctant to participate in an insurance scheme where premiums are subject to shifts in market 
sentiments that may or may not be based on economic fundamentals.     19
reserves relative to GDP. Extending the automobile insurance analogy, this would be like 
charging a higher premium of drivers who insist on driving at a speed that is only half the 
posted speed limit, thereby raising the risks for other drivers who have to get around them. 
The premiums would not be large enough to deter a country that had legitimate needs for 
some self-insurance but it would be an effective tool of moral suasion against bad policies 
(from a global perspective) if a country had to pay higher premiums when its economy was 
doing well.  
Operation of the Insurance System 
The premiums would be invested in a portfolio consisting of government bonds of the 
U.S., Euro area and Japan. In return, the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank (ECB) 
and Bank of Japan would be obliged to backstop the pool’s lines of credit in the event of a 
global crisis. This would simply institutionalize ex-ante swap arrangements of the sort that 
the G-3 central banks opened up ex-post during the crisis to provide liquidity to other 
central banks.  
The insurance payout would be in the form of a credit line open for a year rather than an 
outright grant. The interest rate would be non-punitive and based on the yields on short-
term government securities in the countries backing up the insurance pool.  
The country drawing on this insurance would be required to pay back the borrowed 
amount within the one-year period in the same hard currency that it gets for the loan. So if 
a country’s currency depreciated in the ensuing year, it would have a higher debt burden in 
domestic currency terms, which to some extent would be a disincentive for the country to 
persist with bad policies under the protection provided by the credit line. The country 
would not be able to buy additional insurance until there was a full repayment of the initial 
draw from the insurance pool. Premiums would be raised substantially if a country wished 
to renew its insurance in the next period after drawing on the credit line without any 
improvements in its policies.   
Thus, the insurance would only be suitable for liquidity crises. For an economy beset by a 
solvency crisis, the insurance payout would effectively buy a limited amount of breathing   20
space. Indeed, one could think of reserve accumulation as being relevant for solvency risk 
and this insurance mechanism as being relevant for liquidity risk. Once the credit line 
lapses and if the country turns out to have a solvency rather than liquidity problem (which 
may be difficult to determine ex-ante), then the premiums would rise to punitive levels. In 
that case, the country goes to the IMF for traditional borrowing with ex-post conditionality.  
This mechanism is different from traditional insurance where the idea is to pool risks. In 
this case, the main risk may be global rather than country-specific. This also makes it hard 
to price the premiums in an actuarially “fair” way as the major risks are by definition 
correlated across countries shock if the underlying shock is global.  
Why Can’t the IMF Provide Such Insurance? 
 
In principle, the IMF is the right institution to manage such an insurance mechanism. It has 
become recognized as an independent arbiter of good policies. Besides, there is logic to 
this arrangement—if a credit rating agency had to stand behind its ratings by being on the 
hook for bailing out companies whose finances it rated as being rock solid, that would 
certainly make a difference to the quality of ratings.  
 
However, there are three problems. First, the (much-needed) austerity policies that the IMF 
foists upon countries has made any involvement with the IMF toxic for politicians in 
emerging markets, especially in Asia. Hence the urge for countries to self-insure by 
accumulating reserves, even if that is costly. Second, IMF programs to pre-qualify 
countries for emergency assistance are a source of stigma. Application for pre-qualification 
could itself be seen as a sign of weakness. Indeed, the fact that only three countries—
Mexico, Colombia and Poland—have signed up for the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (FCL), 
which was intended as a pre-qualification mechanism, points to these problems.
20 Third, 
                                                 
20 There is some evidence that signing up for the FCL reduced spreads on these countries’ debt, but 
that evidence has apparently not been sufficient to overcome the stigma effect as there have been 
no additional takers for the FCL. The poor cousin of the FCL is the Precautionary Credit Line 
(PCL), designed to “meet the needs of countries that, despite having sound policies and 
fundamentals, have some remaining vulnerabilities that preclude them from using the FCL.” 
Shockingly, only one country—Macedonia—has so far volunteered to have its policies rated as 
being good but not quite good enough for the PCL.    21
IMF resources are simply not enough—even a trillion dollars is not what it used to be, 
especially in the context of a global crisis. Moreover, the value of an IMF loan used to be 
that the good housekeeping seal of approval of a country’s policy commitments 
accompanying that loan would induce private capital to flow in. As the events during the 
financial crisis have shown, that multiplier effect of IMF lending cannot be counted on 
during a global crisis. 
A fundamental problem is that the IMF has two key roles in the international monetary 
system: the surveillance function—monitoring of countries’ economic policies and 
performance—and crisis lending. These two roles are incompatible if the objective is to 
provide global insurance through the IMF and reduce incentives for the systemically 
important emerging market economies to self-insure by building up huge war chests of 
reserves. The IMF cannot credibly commit to maintaining an open credit line and not 
imposing ex-post conditionality with its loans if a country that qualifies for the FCL starts 
running bad policies. Besides, what the IMF giveth the IMF can take away as the rules of 
the game can obviously be changed quickly in the midst of a crisis.  
 
This mechanism for global insurance would free up the IMF to do what it does best—
conducting surveillance and fixing the policies of countries that have brought upon 
themselves solvency problems in terms of domestic or external debt.  
 
Other Questions 
Why can’t the Federal Reserve or the ECB directly provide credit lines to countries? The 
reason is that the determination of these credit lines then becomes a political matter. If 
there is uncertainty about which countries will receive the Federal Reserve’s benediction—
during the recent crisis, countries like Mexico and South Korea did while others like Peru 
did not—emerging markets cannot count on being protected by the major central banks.  
 
Can the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) provide such insurance? SDRs have 
limited value as an international reserve currency since they lack the fiscal backing of a   22
sovereign government.
21 Moreover, emergency SDR allocations distributed on the basis of 
existing quotas would hardly be sufficient for the major emerging markets. A reallocation 
of SDRs to deliver them where they are most needed again becomes a political decision. 
Most countries would want to avoid placing themselves at the mercy of shifting political 
winds at the IMF.  
 
The crux of the approach sketched out here is that it depoliticizes access to liquidity, either 
from the major advanced economy central banks or through SDR allocations, in the event 
of a major global shock.  
 
Is it politically feasible for a national government to pay premiums for such insurance? 
Given that this option would be cheaper than the quasi-fiscal costs of sterilizing reserves 
that are built up for insurance purposes, would not involve currency risk, and involves a 
relatively modest premium, it should not be difficult for a government to make a strong 
case to its constituents for participation in such a scheme.  
 
Low-income countries might not be able to afford such insurance. But they need 
developmental assistance, not protection from currency crises. So this would initially be an 
insurance pool meant primarily for systemically important countries or even a broader 
range of middle-income economies, although others would be welcome to join.  
Participation 
Would the large economies, especially the major emerging markets, want to sign on to this 
program? Broad participation by the G-20 economies would be important for obviating the 
stigma effect. Unlike in health insurance where broadening the pool by mandating 
universal participation reduces premiums and adverse selection, the broad mandate here 
would mainly be to deal with the stigma effect.  
The solution could be as simple as making participation in this pool a condition for 
                                                 
21 Obstfeld (2011) makes this point and discusses other impediments to the SDR becoming a global 
reserve currency.    23
continued membership in a body such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), where all 
countries would like to have a seat as it will have an important role in developing 
principles for international financial regulation (participation in the insurance pool would, 
however, not be a guarantee of membership in the FSB). This would remove the stigma 
effect and also have the virtue of tying together financial and macroeconomic policies, as 
their interaction is clearly crucial for global economic outcomes. Indeed, the FSB or Bank 
for International Settlements could easily administer this program. No country would be 
forced to buy insurance, of course, but would have to pay the basic membership fee to be 
part of the pool.  
Broader Benefits 
If the insurance-related motive for reserve accumulation were attenuated by this explicit 
insurance scheme, it could help discipline advanced economies’ fiscal policies by raising 
their borrowing costs.
22 This would also tamp down private capital flows to emerging 
markets, an added benefit for countries in that group concerned that cheap money in the 
U.S. and other advanced economies is flowing disproportionately to them and causing 
complications in their domestic macroeconomic management.  
The existence of such an insurance scheme would also help separate out the motives—
mercantilist versus precautionary—behind foreign exchange intervention and related 
reserve accumulation. The costs of reserve accumulation are seen by some emerging 
market policymakers as being balanced by the joint benefits of insurance and maintaining 
trade competitiveness. By providing an alternative (and cheaper) option for insurance, the 
mechanism discussed here would force emerging market economies to more directly 
consider the costs of protecting trade competitiveness through intervention in currency 
markets.  
Global financial stability is in everyone’s interest but it involves solving a collective action 
problem. This scheme would help get the incentives right. First, it reduces the incentives 
                                                 
22 Even though the insurance premiums would be invested in advanced economy bonds, the 
amounts would be far less than the amounts that emerging markets may otherwise accumulate for 
self-insurance through reserve accumulation.    24
for emerging market economies to self-insure; in the event of a liquidity crisis, they would 
have access to a large insurance pool with no conditions attached. This would allow them 
to conduct better macroeconomic policies rather than focus on accumulating reserves. 
Second, it mitigates the risk of spiraling global macroeconomic imbalances and the 
attendant risks of crises and their spillover effects. Third, it creates a transparent 
mechanism by which the global costs of a country’s policies would be internalized to some 
extent or, at a minimum, made more visible.  
6. New Risks from Capital Inflows 
 
The next decade will be one where advanced economies are more vulnerable to external 
crises while emerging market economies are more exposed to domestic fragilities. 
Traditionally, emerging markets were exposed to risks through their dependence on capital 
inflows and the structure of their external liabilities. Few of the significant emerging 
markets are now heavily dependent on foreign finance in terms of net inflows. Even those 
economies like Brazil and India that are running current account deficits have large stocks 
of foreign exchange reserves.
23 And the scourge of short-term foreign currency 
denominated debt has diminished substantially. Flexible exchange rate regimes adopted by 
many emerging markets have also made currency crashes, which often followed a long 
period of forced disequilibrium in currency markets, less of a concern. 
 
Nevertheless, the high levels of financial integration do imply that emerging markets will 
be subject to greater policy spillovers and transmission of shocks from the advanced 
economies. For instance, pure contagion effects due to portfolio rebalancing by advanced 
economy investors could be larger as gross positions increase in size. But these risks are 
still likely to be modest relative to domestic ones.  
 
Capital Flows and Domestic Risks 
 
For emerging market economies, the risks of financial openness will increasingly be 
intermediated through domestic factors. For instance, narrow financial markets can result 
                                                 
23 There are of course exceptions. One is Turkey, which is in a vulnerable position as it has a large 
current account deficit and relies mainly on volatile portfolio equity inflows to finance that deficit.    25
in asset market booms when capital flows into a country. In the absence of regulation that 
is effective and well implemented, inflows can inflate credit booms that eventually end 
badly.
24 One solution is to foster a broader set of financial markets, including corporate 
bond markets and other securities markets for which there is already an intrinsic demand. 
This would help absorb inflows and direct them to more productive rather than speculative 
sectors of the economy.  
 
Financial market development that fails to keep pace with increasing outward orientation 
of domestic firms also creates risks for emerging markets. Firms have an incentive to take 
on foreign-currency denominated debt as a way of hedging against (or even betting on) 
currency appreciation. Broader derivatives markets can help deal with this source of risk.  
 
Capital flows have distributional consequences, a matter of particular concern to emerging 
market economies that are nervous about social stability as many of them have threadbare 
social safety nets.
25 More open economies tend to be prone to higher inequality for a 
number of reasons. First, during the early stages of an economy’s opening up, capital 
account openness tends to favor the rich and the elites. In the early stages, when there are 
still restrictions on foreign capital, politically well-connected firms obtain preferential 
access to foreign financing; large politically connected firms can become even larger 
relative to smaller domestic firms that are reliant on inefficient domestic financial 
institutions. This phenomenon of crony capitalism played a role in precipitating the Asian 
financial crisis.
26 Larger firms in the manufacturing sector typically tend to be more capital 
intensive and generate less employment, further skewing the benefits from financial 
openness.  
 
                                                 
24 Kose and Prasad (2010), Frankel and Saravelos (2011) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) 
identify rapid expansion of domestic credit in the run-up to the recent crisis as a factor that led to 
worse outcomes for some emerging markets, particularly those in Emerging Europe.  
25 Ye (2011) reports preliminary evidence that greater financial openness is associated with greater 
wage inequality among emerging market economies. Rajan (2010) discusses how, even in the U.S., 
inequality and a feeble safety net led to distorted government policies that ultimately led to an 
unraveling of the financial system.  
26 See, for instance, Krueger and Yoo (2002).    26
Second, foreign finance that pours into equity markets and raises valuations tends to have 
greater benefits for households that have more financial wealth in the form of equity 
investments. Third, capital account openness can create inequities in terms of 
diversification and risk sharing. Richer households are able to share risk through their 
international investments. Even in countries with open capital accounts, this is a problem 
for poorer households that simply do not have investment vehicles to invest abroad. 
Fourth, since poorer households have less access to foreign investment opportunities, they 
disproportionately bear the costs of domestic financial repression. For instance, in China, 
capital controls on outflows have been eased, allowing households to take out $50,000 
each per year, a large sum by most standards. However, relatively poor households do not 
have access to vehicles like mutual funds to easily invest abroad. So the available choices 
are either the highly volatile Chinese stock market or safe bank deposits that pay negative 
real interest rates.  
 
The combination of weak policies and weak institutions generally has more adverse 
consequences in emerging markets compared to advanced economies. For instance, 
financial repression in advanced economies is less of a concern from the perspective of 
generating inequitable outcomes as there are other investment opportunities available to 
retail investors, making them less reliant on domestic banks.  
 
Ultimately, the main collateral benefit of financial opening might be that it forces national 
governments to put in place better policies. There is little evidence that financial 
globalization has improved the quality of fiscal and monetary policies, but perhaps the real 
issue is about an alternative set of policies that creates broader financial access to the 
formal financial system, catalyzes better public and corporate governance, and provides a 
strong incentive for financial market development.
27  
 
                                                 
27 For more discussion of the potential collateral benefits of financial globalization and why they 
may be more important than the direct financing effects of foreign capital, see Kose, Prasad, 
Rogoff and Wei (2009).    27
Policy Complications 
 
The longer-term perspectives discussed above are of little comfort to emerging market 
policymakers facing immediate pressures from capital inflows. Capital controls have been 
touted as a legitimate tool to deal with surges of inflows. Such inflows can certainly leave 
long-lasting scars on a country’s tradable goods sector and export market shares if they 
result in persistent currency appreciations. There are many problems with capital controls, 
however. As trade expands, financial markets develop and become more sophisticated, and 
corporations and financial institutions increase their cross-border operations, the capital 
account becomes porous and capital controls are more easily circumvented, especially if 
the incentives such as cross-border interest differentials are strong enough. This makes 
capital controls largely ineffective in terms of controlling the overall volume of flows.
28  
 
What about selective capital controls—is it possible to use the hierarchy of capital flows to 
develop guidelines under which countries may intervene in foreign exchange markets or 
use targeted capital controls with the blessings of the international community? The 
problem with this latter approach is that money tends to be quite fungible. Indeed, in 
countries with relatively well-developed financial markets, such fungibility is an even 
bigger issue and it has proven difficult to keep money from coming in (or leaving) through 
multiple channels. Moreover, most major emerging markets now have relatively open 
capital accounts, especially in de facto terms, and trying to turn the clock back is unlikely 
to be effective and would just create policy uncertainty.  
 
Determining when capital controls are legitimate requires fine judgments about the 
temporary versus persistent nature of flows, which is difficult in real time. The same is true 
of determining whether current account balances are being driven by transitory or 
permanent shocks, which makes it difficult to arrive at judgments about their appropriate 
level. Determining the appropriate level of current account balances will become even 
                                                 
28 See, for instance, Magud, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2009) 
discuss how de facto financial integration is proceeding faster than de jure financial opening for 
many middle-income economies.    28
more complicated as current accounts become increasingly driven by valuation effects and 
earnings on countries’ external portfolios.  
 
The IMF has proposed the creation of “rules of the road” to protect countries that have the 
right policies but get caught up in spillovers of global turmoil or in policy spillovers from 
large economies. To make progress on this requires clear benchmarks against which to 
evaluate current account balances and capital flows. Economic theory in its current form 
does not provide good benchmarks for evaluating the direction and patterns of capital 
flows, especially given various aspects of market incompleteness, information asymmetries, 
institutional weaknesses and other frictions. This will make it difficult to construct useful 
rules of the road that have general applicability. This is an area where intensive academic 
research is sorely needed to generate better analytical frameworks, although it is still not 
clear if such rules are desirable or enforceable.  
 
Rather than focus on evaluating the appropriateness and sustainability of current account 
balances and exchange rates, a more productive analytical approach might be to ask what 
market failures are leading to a pattern of capital flows that is not efficient and increases 
global risks. Unconstrained leverage is a problem that can be handled through regulatory 
tools. Other than that, many problems in terms of policy spillovers can be traced to weak 
macroeconomic frameworks among both the suppliers and recipients of capital. Dealing 
with the effects of one set of distortions by adding more distortions in the form of capital 
controls and other ad hoc measures may ultimately prove counter-productive by 
exacerbating policy instability.  
 
A more efficient approach is to improve a range of other policies, from financial 
development and banking regulation to fiscal and monetary policies, so that capital flows 
in a more stable and efficient manner. For instance, broader and better-regulated financial 
markets can help emerging markets to absorb inflows and effectively intermediate them 
into productive rather than speculative activities.  
   29
It is also in the self-interest of emerging markets as a group to foster financial market 
development. This will allow them to invest more amongst themselves rather than finance 
fiscal profligacy in advanced economies. Advanced economies’ deeper and broader 
financial markets have made it easier for them to finance their deficits and allowed a 
number of them to avoid major reforms notwithstanding crises that they experienced. In 
the case of emerging markets, by contrast, financing constraints made significant policy 
reforms imperative when these economies were hit by crises.  
 
One paradox is that in the short run emerging markets with better financial markets and 
good growth prospects may end up having to deal with a larger quantum of flows than 
those with underdeveloped financial markets that intrinsically limit foreign investment. 
There are few easy answers to these transitional risks.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I have documented dramatic shifts in the composition of emerging markets’ 
balance sheets. Their liabilities have come to be dominated by FDI and portfolio equity 
flows, while their assets are increasingly in the form of foreign exchange reserves. In 
tandem with the uphill flows of capital characterized in other studies, this implies a sharp 
role reversal between emerging markets and advanced economies. Emerging markets have 
not only become net exporters of capital to the advanced economies but have also 
substantially reduced the risk emanating from the structure of their external liabilities even 
as advanced economies’ external liabilities continue to be dominated by debt.  
 
At one level, financial globalization seems to proceeding along the right track. Emerging 
markets are getting more capital in forms that promote international risk sharing and make 
them less vulnerable to sudden shifts in sentiment. Overall, their dependence on foreign 
capital is limited. As a group they have become net exporters of capital and even those 
countries like Brazil and India that have current account deficits have large stocks of 
reserves. Many of these countries have also adopted better monetary policy frameworks 
with flexible exchange rates, reducing the risk of currency crashes.   30
 
This picture is clouded by the fact that advanced economies have boxed themselves in with 
undisciplined fiscal policies that could erode their productivity and growth. Moreover, the 
external liabilities of these economies continue to be dominated by debt. Even though a 
large share of their external liabilities is denominated in their own currencies, leverage and 
weak regulation have proven to be a toxic combination in many advanced economies. In 
tandem with rising domestic and external sovereign debt, this makes them vulnerable to 
adverse shocks. It may be time for advanced economies to consider implementing the 
macroeconomic and structural reform agenda that they have for so long preached to the 
emerging markets.  
   31
Appendix A: Country List 
 
Advanced Economies (29): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
Emerging Markets (29): Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine.    32
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 Table 1. Gross External Assets and Liabilities as a Ratio to GDP 
 
  2000  2007  2010 
Advanced Economies       
     Median  219.7  414.2  474.0 
     Group ratio  226.7  427.9  427.9 
Emerging Markets       
     Median  104.4  130.7  139.8 
     Group ratio  90.4  119.0  120.8 
Selected Advanced Economies       
Euro Area average  322.8  523.0  527.2 
    Germany  274.1  414.2  474.0 
Japan  102.4  194.5  196.9 
U.K.  601.0  1126.8  1308.0 
U.S.  138.8  274.5  294.1 
Selected Emerging Markets       
Brazil  86.7  93.6  90.4 
China  69.7  104.3  109.9 
India  41.8  64.8  69.7 
Russia  166.7  179.7  171.8 
Saudi Arabia  102.6  192.0  251.3 
South Africa  145.2  174.3  185.2 
Data sources: IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Lane-Milesi-Ferretti (2010). For the 
U.S., data for 2010 are from the Survey of Current Business, July 2011 (Table 1 on page 121). 
 
Notes: Median refers to the cross-sectional median of the ratio across the countries in the group. 
The group ratio is the sum of external assets and liabilities for all countries in the group divided 
by the sum of their nominal GDPs. For a few countries, data for 2009 were used when data for 
2010 were not available and data for 2001 or 2002 were used when data for 2000 were not 
available. Euro Area countries not included in the sample are Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta.   Table 2.  International Investment Positions in 2010 
            (in billions of U.S. dollars)  
 
  Germany  Japan  U.K.  U.S.  Brazil  China  India  Russia 
 
 
             
Net Position  1383.1  3087.7  -317.2  -2470.9  -698.2  1790.7  -122.9  118 
A. Assets                 
Total  8550.1  6918.7  14539.4  20315.4  595.4  4126.0  380.9  1109.2 
1. FDI  1425.8  831.1  1674.5  4429.4  175.2  310.8  77.2  318.7 
2. Portfolio  2581.1  3345.8  3240.4  6222.9  16.6  257.1  1.2  38.1 
Equity  764.6  678.5  1158.7  4485.6  0.8  63.0  1.2  2.5 
Debt  1816.5  2667.4  2081.7  1737.3  15.8  194.1  0.0  35.6 
3. Other invst.  3278.9  1592.4  5984.3  5521.5  114.9  643.9  19.0  310.7 
4. Resv. assets  216.5  1096.7  77.6  488.7  288.6  2914.2  283.5  439.4 
Fx reserves  37.4  1036.3  49.3  51.8  280.6  2847.3  258.6  405.8 
5. Fin. 
derivatives 
1047.8  52.6  3562.7  3652.9  0.2  0.0  0.0  2.3 
B. Liabilities                 
Total  7167.0  3831.0  14856.6  22786.3  1293.7  2335.4  503.8  990.8 
1. FDI  956.6  214.9  1075.9  2658.9  472.6  1476.4  164.0  382.5 
2. Portfolio  3019.7  1871.7  3939.0  7266.8  656.3  221.6  117.1  216.4 
Equity  590.2  988.8  1471.6  2991.6  430.2  206.1  93.3  173.0 
Debt  2429.6  882.9  2467.3  9138.8  226.1  15.5  23.8  43.4 
3. Other invst.  2139.8  1679.7  6374.9  4454.5  161.0  637.3  222.8  385.2 
4. Fin. 
derivatives 
1050.8  64.7  3466.9  3542.5  3.8  0.0  0.0  6.8 
 
Data sources: IMF’s International Financial Statistics and U.S. Survey of Current Business.  
 
Notes: Data for Brazil, China, Japan, Germany, U.K. and the U.S. are for the year 2010, and data 
for India and Russia are for the year 2009.  Table 3. Structure of External Liabilities and Assets 
Data sources: IMF’s International Financial Statistics, Lane-Milesi-Ferretti (2010) and U.S. Survey of Current Business.   
Notes: Median refers to the cross-sectional median of the ratio across the countries in the group. The group ratio is the sum of the numerator 
variable for all countries in the group divided by the sum of the denominator variable for those countries. Economies not included in “Euro Area” 
are Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta.  For some economies, 2009 data are used whenever 2010 data are not available, and 2001 or 2002 data are 









  2000  2007  2010  2000  2007  2010  2000  2007  2010  2000  2007  2010 
Advanced Economies                         
     Median  20.0  18.4  19.7  15.0  13.8  9.9  40.3  38.6  31.4  5.8  1.9  1.2 
     Group ratio  17.5  15.3  14.9  21.6   16.3  13.6  39.1  31.6  28.5  3.7  2.5  3.0 
 
Emerging Markets 
                       
     Median  31.8  39.4  40.5  3.7  8.4  8.2  34.4  56.7  56.2  34.6  43.7  38.8 
     Group ratio  33.0  42.0  46.4  7.4  18.8  14.5  40.4  60.8  60.9  31.7  49.9  52.7 
 
Selected Advanced Economies 
                       
Euro Area average  17.7  17.0  15.5  20.2  15.8  12.4  38.0  32.7  27.9  2.1  0.7  0.7 
     Germany  17.9  15.8  13.3  11.7  13.8  8.2  29.6  29.6  21.6  1.9  0.6  0.4 
Japan  2.8  4.2  5.6  30.4  39.4  25.8  33.1  43.6  31.4  11.7  17.7  15.0 
U.K.  10.2  7.6  7.2  22.2  10.4  9.9  32.5  18.0  17.1  0.8  0.3  0.3 
U.S.  18.8  11.9  11.7  21.7  16.0  13.1  40.4  27.9  24.8  0.5  0.2  0.3 
 
Selected Emerging Markets                         
Brazil  32.8  33.6  36.5  9.9  39.6  33.3  42.7  73.2  69.8  33.2  48.5  47.1 
China  59.4  57.3  63.2  5.7  5.6  8.8  61.4  66.3  65.6  37.6  63.3  69.0 
India  14.7  25.8  32.5  12.6  24.8  18.5  27.2  50.5  51.1  59.8  79.4  67.9 
Russia  17.5  39.5  38.6  6.0  24.9  17.5  23.5  64.4  56.1  9.8  42.7  36.6 
Saudi Arabia  54.1  52.8  60.0  0.0  3.8  3.5  54.1  56.7  63.5  13.8  53.9  56.0 
South Africa  43.5  39.0  41.5  22.6  38.9  35.0  66.1  77.9  76.5  6.2  13.6  13.4 Table 4. Changes in Structure of Emerging Markets’ External Portfolios: 2000-07 
 
    A. Liabilities    B. Assets 
  Change in 
FDI Liabs. / 
Change in 
Total Liabs. 
Change in Port. Eq. 
Liabs. / Change in 
Total Liabs. 
Change in 
FDI+PE Liabs. / 
Change in Total 
Liabs. 
Change in Fx 
Reserves / Chg. 
in Total Assets 
Argentina  -0.5  -7.5  -7.1  37.2 
Brazil  34.2  59.7  93.9  54.7 
Bulgaria  67.8  1.7  69.5  66.1 
Chile  65.7  5.5  71.2  1.7 
China  56.3  13.7  70.0  69.0 
Colombia  79.7  2.6  82.3  37.4 
Hungary  59.6  4.2  63.9  6.7 
India  31.4  31.0  62.4  83.9 
Indonesia  58.4  33.3  91.7  50.0 
Jordan  65.7  19.9  85.5  47.9 
Kazakhstan  32.5  9.5  42.0  19.4 
Kenya  60.2  7.5  67.6  51.8 
Latvia  21.3  0.8  22.1  22.7 
Lithuania  35.4  1.7  37.1  37.9 
Malaysia  31.3  41.6  72.8  43.5 
Mexico  52.6  37.8  90.3  39.8 
Morocco  81.4  8.2  89.6  69.4 
Nigeria  122.9  53.3  176.2  72.9 
Pakistan  59.4  8.2  67.6  78.0 
Peru  42.0  44.8  86.9  55.6 
Philippines  25.9  34.1  60.0  46.3 
Poland  48.2  9.2  57.5  32.5 
Romania  48.3  1.6  49.9  77.9 
Russia  43.3  28.1  71.5  52.4 
Saudi Arabia  52.1  6.0  58.1  65.9 
South Africa  36.5  47.8  84.3  19.3 
Thailand  61.7  46.9  108.5  48.4 
Turkey  40.9  17.2  58.1  44.5 
Ukraine  36.5  1.4  38.0  38.0 
         
Median  48.3  9.5  69.5  47.9 
Group ratio  47.1  25.2  72.3  56.1 
Group ratio ex. China  45.3  27.4  72.7  48.7 
Data sources: IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Lane-Milesi-Ferretti (2010).  
Notes: The first column shows the change in the stock of a country’s FDI liabilities from 2000 to 
2007 as a ratio of the change in that country’s total external liabilities over the same period. The 
group ratio is the sum of the numerator variable for all countries in the group divided by the sum 





















Brazil  206  186  Sep-08  Feb-09  9.6  5  312 
Bulgaria  20  14  Sep-08  Jan-09  30.6  4  15 
India  305  239  May-08  Nov-08  21.7  6  282 
Indonesia  58  48  Jul-08  Feb-09  17.5  7  107 
Malaysia  125  87  Jun-08  Mar-09  30.6  9  118 
Mexico  98  79  Sep-08  Aug-09  19.0  11  120 
Nigeria  62  42  Sep-08  Aug-09  32.7  11  33 
Peru  35  28  Jun-08  Feb-09  18.5  8  42 
Poland  82  56  Jul-08  Jan-09  31.6  6  95 
Russia  582  367  Jul-08  Feb-09  37.0  7  463 
South Korea  264  200  Mar-08  Nov-08  24.3  8  303 
Turkey  76  64  Sep-08  Apr-09  16.0  7  88 
Ukraine  37  24  Sep-08  Apr-09  36.5  7  37 
 
Median          27.4  7   
 
Data source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics, CEIC. 
 
Notes: This table shows the recent peak and trough of a country’s stock of foreign exchange 
reserves during the financial crisis. Absolute levels of reserves are in billions of U.S. dollars. The 
economies selected for this table are relatively large emerging markets (along with South Korea) 
that experienced significant reserve losses.   Figure 1. Uphill Capital Flows: Current Account Balances 
 






































Data source: IMF's World Economic Outlook 
 
Notes: The aggregate numbers in this figure are based on a sample that includes 29 advanced and 
29 emerging market economies, which are listed in the Appendix. The aggregate ratios for each 
group of countries are obtained by adding up all current account balances (in U.S. dollars) and 
dividing by the sum of their nominal GDPs (in U.S. dollars). Data for 2011 are based on IMF 
forecasts. Figure 2. Rising Financial Openness 
 
A. Advanced Economies 
 
B. Emerging Market Economies 
 
Data source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) 
 
Notes: Financial openness is defined as the sum of gross external assets and gross external 
liabilities expressed as a ratio to nominal GDP, with all variables measured in current price U.S. 
dollars at market exchange rates. The median is the cross-sectional median calculated separately 
for each year for the relevant group of countries. The weighted mean is the ratio of the sum of 
external assets and liabilities for all countries in the group expressed as a ratio of the sum of 
nominal GDP for all countries in that group. Figure 3. Key Components of Emerging Market External Assets and Liabilities 
 































Data source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) 
 
Notes: Stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity (PE) and external debt are 
shown as ratios of total external liabilities (L). The stock of foreign exchange reserves is shown 
as a ratio to total external assets (A). The median is the cross-sectional median calculated 
separately for each year for the relevant group of countries. The weighted mean is the ratio of the 
sum of external assets and liabilities for all countries in the group expressed as a ratio of the sum 
of nominal GDP for all countries in that group.  Figure 4. Reserve Accumulation by Emerging Markets  













 Figure 5. Foreign Exchange Reserves Held by Emerging Markets 
 











































Data sources: IMF COFER Database, June 30, 2011; The People’s Bank of China 
 Figure 6. World Government Debt 
 
A. Aggregate Debt (in trillions of U.S. dollars) 
 
 




Data sources: IMF's Fiscal Monitor, International Financial Statistics and World Economic 
Outlook 
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate level of general government debt (upper panel) and the 
ratio of this variable to aggregate world GDP (lower panel), with all variables converted to U.S. 
dollars at market exchange rates. In the upper panel, the data for advanced and emerging market 
economies add up to the world aggregates. In the lower panel, aggregate debt is expressed as a 
ratio of aggregate GDP for the respective group of countries.  Net debt is used except for the 
following countries that report only gross debt data: Advanced Economies -- Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Slovak Republic and Slovenia; Emerging Market 
Economies -- Argentina, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, 
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Data sources: IMF's Fiscal Monitor, International Financial Statistics and World Economic 
Outlook 
 
Notes: Other AE denotes other advanced economies and EM stands for emerging markets. GDP 
is measured at current prices and converted to a common currency at market exchange rates. 
                     Figure 8. Global Distribution of Net Government Debt 
  









Data sources: IMF's Fiscal Monitor, International Financial Statistics and World Economic 
Outlook 
Notes: Other AE denotes other advanced economies and EM stands for emerging markets. Net 
debt is used except for the following countries that report only gross debt data: Advanced 
Economies -- Czech Republic, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia; Emerging Market Economies -- Argentina, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia and Thailand.           




 Figure 9. Contributions of Different Economic Areas to  
Changes in Global Public Debt and GDP 
 


































Data sources: IMF's Fiscal Monitor, International Financial Statistics and World Economic 
Outlook 
Notes: These charts show the contributions of different countries/ country groups to the changes 
in the absolute levels of world net government debt and the absolute levels of world GDP 
(measured in a common currency at market exchange rates). Net debt is used except for the 
following countries that report only gross debt data: Advanced Economies -- Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Slovak Republic and Slovenia; Emerging Market 
Economies -- Argentina, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, 
Russia and Thailand.                   
   Figure 10. Central Government Debt of Major Reserve Currency Economic Areas 
 
A. Debt Relative to GDP 
(in percent) 
 
B. Absolute Levels of Debt 
(in trillions of U.S. dollars) 
Data sources: EIU and IMF Fiscal Monitor, April and June 2011 Update; IMF WEO, April and 
June 2011 Update.   
 
Notes: Data were not available on net debt of the Euro Zone countries held by investors from 
outside the Euro Zone.    
 Figure 11. Foreign Financing of U.S. Treasury Debt Buildup  










Data source: Treasury Bulletin, June 2011 Issue, United States Treasury.   
 
Notes: Each bar denotes increases in net debt—total level and the level accounted for by foreign 
investors—calculated as the year to year change in end-of-year debt stocks (as reported in series 
(3) and (11) in Table OFS-2 on p. 41 of data source). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 